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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE OF 
UTAH, administering THE STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, and PARK 
CITY CONSOLIDATED MINES 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, SAM E. WILLIAMS, and 
SILVER KING COALITION MINES 
COMPANY, a corporation, and CON-
TINENTAL CASUALTY COM-
P ANY, a corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7726 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 15, 1950 Sam E. Williams filed an application 
with the Industrial Commission of Utah, in which he 
claimed that he was entitled to benefits under the Utah 
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occupational disease law for silicosis complicated with 
tuberculosis. This application named the Park City Con-
solidated Mines Company as the employer and the State 
Insurance Fund as its compensation insurer. Later Mr. 
Williams filed another application with the Industrial Com-
mission, in which he named the defendant, Silver King 
Coalition Mines Company as his employer and the defendant, 
Continental Casualty Company as its compensation insur-
ance carrier. The Industrial Commission combined these 
applications into one case and held a hearing on April 25, 
1951. In its decision of May 22, 1951 the commission dis-
missed the case as to Silver King and the Continental Casu-
alty Company; and the commission held that the Park City 
Consolidated Mines Company and the State Insurance Fund 
were liable for payment of occupational disease benefits to 
the applicant. From that decision and the Industrial Com-
mission's denial of an application for rehearing, the Plain-
tiffs have brought the matter to the Supreme Court for 
review. 
The following periods of Mr. Williams' employment 
were stipulated at the hearing before the Industrial Com-
mission. He worked as an employee of Park City Consoli-
dated Mines Company from Jan. 1, 1934 to Oct. 3, 1942. 
Then he worked as an employee of Silver King Coalition 
Mines Company from Oct. 5, 1942 to Feb. 1, 1948. While 
he was still employed by the Silver King in 1946 he made a 
written agreement with the Park City Consolidated Mines 
Company to inspect that company's mine (R. 9 and 10), and 
he was paid $50 for performing that work. 
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The following year while he was still employed by the 
Silver King he entered into another written contract with 
the Park City Consolidated Mines Company dated May 26, 
1947, which is in evidence as Exhibit 4 (R. 84). In this 
agreement Mr. Williams agreed to retimber the shaft in 
the Park City Consolidated Mines Company's mine at Park 
City, "of 15 sets more or less." The Company agreed to 
furnish all of the materials. Mr. Williams agreed to furnish 
all of the labor, to pay all labor bills, to obtain waivers of 
labor liens and to do a job satisfactorily to the company. 
The company agreed to pay Mr. Williams the actual labor 
cost, plus 10%. There was no period of time specified in 
the agreement, within which the work should be performed 
or completed. Mr. Williams proceeded to perform the job 
he had contracted under this agreement, but he also con-
tinued to work as an employee at the Silver King mine until 
Feb. 1, 1948. Then he quit his job at the Silver King and 
from Feb. 1, 1948 until June 13, 1949 he devoted himself to 
the work at the Park City Consolidated. 
In June 1949 Mr. Williams went to Colorado for the 
Park City Consolidated to work as a compressor man, this 
work continuing until December 1949. It was stipulated 
that his work in Colorado did not expose him to any silica 
dust (R. 28). From December 1949 until April 1950 he 
was in Utah, but was not working. In April and May, 1950 
he worked for a period of 27 days for Park City Consoli-
dated at Park City. 
In its decision the Industrial Commission stated the 
issue as follows: 
"Defendants, Park City Consolidated Mines 
Company and The State Insurance Fund, defend on 
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the ground that applicant was not exposed to harm-
ful quantities of free silicon-dioxide dust sixty days 
or more as an employee of Park City Consolidated. 
There was no exposure in Colorado. The last em-
ployment in Utah was for a period of 27 days. Unless 
applicant was in fact an employee of Park City Con-
solidated for a sufficient number of days during 
1948 and 1949 which added to the days of employ-
ment after his return from Colorado, would total 60 
days or more, applicant's claim against defendant 
Park City Consolidated must be denied. 
"The period in question is February 1, 1948 to 
June 13, 1949. Defendants Park City Consolidated 
and The State Insurance Fund contend that appli-
cant was an independent contractor during that 
period and that his total exposure as an employee, if 
any, was only 27 days." 
The Commission then made a finding and conclusion 
that the 1946 contract and the 1947 contract were inde-
pendent contracts, but that Sam Williams' work under the 
terms of the 194 7 contract was completed in April 1948. 
The Commission concluded that from April 1948 to June 
13, 1949 Sam Williams was under the supervision and 
control of the Park City Consolidated Mines Company and 
therefore he was an "employee," and that he had more 
than 60 days exposure to silica dust in the employ of that 
Company. 
On September 13, 1947 Sam Williams made a written 
application to the State Insurance Fund for a compensa-
tion insurance policy, in which application he designated 
himself as the employer and specified that he was applying 
for this policy as an "Individual," (as distinguished from 
a partnership or corporation) (Exhibit 2; R. 39 and 82). 
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The policy was issued to him effective that date and re-
mained in force until June 13, 1949. During all of that 
period of time Mr. Williams made monthly payroll reports 
to the State Insurance Fund of the wages of the men he 
had working for him at the property of the Park City Con-
solidated, and he paid the Fund the premiums computed on 
the wages of all of those men for that period of one year 
and nine months. During that entire period Mr. Williams 
also made regular deductions from the men's wages and 
reported the wages and deductions for social security to the 
United States government and also to the Employment 
Security Division of the Industrial Commission (R. 40, 41, 
45). 
In making his payroll reports and premium payments 
to the State Insurance Fund, Williams did not include him-
self or pay any premium on himself. He had inquired at 
the office of the State Insurance Fund if he could be cover-
ed, and he was informed that the policy did not cover him 
for injuries he might have (R. 40 and 41). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION THAT THE CONTRACT EN-
TERED INTO BY THE APPLICANT AND 
PARK CITY CONSOLIDATED MINES GAVE 
RISE TO AN INDEPENDENT CONTRAC-
TUAL RELATIONSHIP IS CORRECT. 
The basis of the Commission's conclusion lies in the 
satisfaction of all the elements contained in Section 42-
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la-10 of the occupational disease law which defines "In-
dependent Contractor" : 
"Any person, firm or corporation engaged in 
the performance of work as an independent con-
tractor shall be deemed an employer within the 
meaning of this section. The term "independent 
contractor" as herein used, is defined to be any 
person, association or corporation engaged in the 
performance of any work for another, who, while 
so engaged, is independent of the employer in all 
that pertains to the execution of the work, is not 
subject to the rule or control of the employer, is 
engaged only in the performance of a definite job 
or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer 
only in effecting a result in accordance with the 
employer's design." 
The contract itself called for retimbering of 15 sets, 
more or less, to the satisfaction of the company. No right 
of supervision was reserved expressly to the company, 
nor was it inferred. The testimony of Mr. Kasteler, the 
company's representative at the site of the operations in 
question, indicates that he in fact exercised no supervision 
as to the detail of the work (R. 64 and 66). 
Mr. Williams, the applicant, and his crew were en-
gaged in replacing 15 sets of timber, more or less-a 
specific piece of work. 
The contract reserved to Park City Consolidated only 
the right to determine whether the result was in accord-
ance with it's design. 
Moreover, during the performance of the contract, 
Williams had the right to hire employees of his choosing 
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and had the right to fire them. He used his personally-
owned time-books to record the hours his men worked for 
him. p·eriodically he submitted to the company a state-
ment of the amount due him. The company thereupon paid 
him a lump-sum amount, based upon cost of labor plus 
10%, a usual basis of payment for contracted work. See 
Elizabeth J. Carleton v. Foundry and Machine Products 
Co., 199 Mich. 148, 165 N. W. 816. 
In addition, Williams himself paid his employees. He 
secured an insurance policy with the State Insurance Fund, 
in which he signed an application and several payroll re-
ports as an employer. He submitted in his own name, as an 
employer, social security and unemployment compensation 
reports directly to the Federal and State Agencies concern-
ed therewith. He paid the taxes to these agencies, computed 
on the basis of the salary he paid his men. 
POINT 2. 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION THAT UNTIL THE MONTH OF 
APRIL, 1948, WILLIAMS WAS AN INDEPEN-
DENT CONTRACTOR IS CORRECT. 
The 1947 contract between Williams and Park City 
Consolidated called for 15 sets of timbering, "more or less." 
Though the facts are somewhat obscure, it appears that 
the completion of the hanging of the . 15 sets took place 
several months before April, 1948, which is the time when 
the complete retimbering of the shaft was accomplished, 
and the time when the Industrial Commission found that 
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Williams' status with respect to Park City Consolidated 
ehanged to that of an employee. After the hanging of the 
first 15 sets, at least 45 additional sets were installed. 
Every element of an independent contractual relation-
ship, as discussed under Point 1 of this brief, remained 
after the completion of the 1947 contract for retimbering 
the shaft. There is no evidence of any supervision in the 
placing of the 60 sets in the shaft. Williams testified that 
Kasteler decided "that further timbering should be done" 
(R. 60) . In answer to the question as to who decided which 
sets should be replaced, the applicant stated: "Sometimes 
I did and sometimes Kasteler did. He told me to use my 
judgment on it and if they were rotten enough to take 
them out and replace them" (R. 60) . This is hardly testi-
mony evincing supervision over the details of the work. In 
the examination of the witness, Kasteler, no evidence of 
supervision as to detail nor of right of supervision is to be 
found. 
POINT 3. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S CONCLU-
SION THAT THE STATUS OF SAM WIL-
LIAMS FROM APRIL, 1948 TO JUNE 13, 1949 
CHANGED TO THAT OF AN "EMPLOYEE" 
IS ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The evidence throughout the entire record goes to 
the rehabilitation of the Park City Mine-to prepare for 
a resumption, at some later date, of mining operations. 
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the ap-
plicant's continuing the work after the completion of the 
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1947 contract, was his agreement, in consideration of the 
receipt of the same benefits flowing from the 1947 con-
tract, to perform definite and specific jobs, all parts of 
a larger undertaking, viz., the rehabilitation of the Park 
City Mine. 
The record shows that after the retimbering of the 
shaft, the applicant and his men went on to perform other 
definite jobs. Specifically, to the extent that it can be 
determined from the record, these jobs were completed in 
the order stated: spiling the 'C' Drift, laying rails to the 
'930' raise, placing the compressor, laying pipe, retimber-
hlg the raise, disposing of wasterock, and finally, cross-
cut and drifting operations. To sustain the conclusion of 
the Industrial Commission, in the light of Section 42-1a-10 
of the Utah Code, the record of this case must contain sub-
stantial and competent evidence to show that the relation-
ship of Sam E. Williams to Park City Consolidated changed 
so that the elements of an independent contractual status 
were no longer present. And to be substantial, the evidence 
must possess something of substantial and relevent con-
sequence, and must not consist of vague, uncertain, or 
irrelevent matter not carrying the quality of proof or hav-
ing fitness to induce conviction. Milford Copper Co. of 
Utah et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., 61 Utah 37, 210 
Pac. 993. And even though the facts used to support the 
conclusion may be found by inference, yet the inference 
must be a legitimate one. There must be a reasonable 
theory which leads to the conclusion reached. A finding 
cannot be predicated upon mere surmise or conjecture. 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 64 
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Utah 415, 231 Pac. 442. However, if two inferences may 
be deduced from the evidence, one of which authorizes the 
a ward and the other not, and both inferences are equally 
reasonable, the Commission may ,not arbitrarily disregard 
one of the inferences and choose the other. In such cir-
cumstances the inferences meet and destroy each other, 
and neither has any probative force or effect. Spring Can-
yon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 608, 201 
Pac. 173. 
The test of "control" has long been recognized as 
the most determinative one in the consideration of the 
relationship of the parties to the contract. The equivalent 
in the workmen's compensation law to Section 42-1a-10 
has been construed by this court in several cases, in which 
it has been held that an independent contractor is one who 
is under contract to render service or do work for another 
according to his own method, means and manner of doing 
the work and ,without being subject to the control, direc-
tion or supervision of such other, except as to the result 
of the work or service. Gogoff v. Industrial Commission, 
77 Utah 353, 296 P. 229; Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 
148 Pac. 408. It is the right to control which is the most 
important test, and not control itself. Luker Sand & Gravel 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 82 Utah 188, 23 P. (2d) 225. 
In the instant case there is no substantial evidence of a 
right to control reserved to Kasteler or .to any other com-
pany representative from the time the contract of May, 
1947 was completed to June 13, 1949. There is no express 
right nor can one reasonably be inferred from the conduct 
of the parties. The record shows that Kasteler's conduct 
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consisted of giving directions as to what was next to be 
done at the completion of a specific job; not how the job 
was to be done with respect to manner of performance of 
the details. If there were certain specifications he felt 
that Williams should meet, Kasteler would indicate them. 
For example, he designated the spots at which rails were 
to be laid. But such conduct on the part of Kasteler is no 
indication of a right to control essential details of the work. 
The mere fact that the company may have an overseer 
to see that the work is done to the satisfaction of the 
company, in his best judgment, does not change the char-
acter of the contract. Hampton v. Unterkircher, 97 Iowa 
509, 66 N. W. 776. 
With respect to the spiling operation, Kasteler testi-
fied that after indicating what job he next wanted done, 
i.e., the spiling, Mr. Williams in his experience would 
supervise it (R. 68). With respect to the performance of 
the job involving the disposal of wasterock, the witness 
Kasteler was asked by applicant's attorney what arrange-
ment he made with Williams about disposing of the waste-
rock. Mr. Kasteler answered that 'it was agreed' that they 
would gob it in a particular place (R. 72). With respect to 
the retimbering of the raise, Kasteler was asked by appli-
cant's attorney whether the retimbering was done at 
Kasteler's direction. Kasteler answered : "Yes, the outline 
of the work" (R. 70). All of this testimony on the part 
of Kasteler shows very clearly that he was not wielding 
control over the manner in which Williams performed, 
but rather was concerning himself with designating what 
the next specific job was to be. As it is so clearly stated in 
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the ca~e of Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, 65 Utah 168, 
235 P. 884, the status of an independent contractor is not 
affected by the mere fact that the employer may super-
vise and direct in matters necessary to a faithful per-
formance of the contract. 
Looking at the testimony of the applicant, there are 
only two instances in the record where he testified as to 
the manner of performing a specific job. He answer "Yes" 
to the question of his attorney as to whether he had any 
recollection of Kasteler's giving him orders as to the man-
ner in which the wasterock was to be disposed of (R. 33). 
Even assuming that his answer went to the performance 
and not to the recollection, the testimony of Kasteler on 
cross examination shows that no control over performance 
existed. In answer to a question by counsel for the ap-
plicant: "Do you recall telling me that Mr. Williams was 
on his own?" Kasteler answer : "So far as supervision, yes. 
Sam was a good man" Ca. 75). With respect to the cross-
cut and drifting operations, Williams testified that he 
had no part in "selecti~g the manner of performing" the 
operation ( R. 34) . The testimony is vague, but assuming 
that the expression "selecting a manner of performing" 
means an adoption of one of two or more possible pro-
cedures to drive a drift, it nevertheless contains no evi-
dence of actual control of the details of performance from 
which a right to such control may reasonably be inferred. 
The record contains no substantial evidence of Wil-
liams' right to control his own men being assumed by the 
Company in the course of accomplishing the various 
specific jobs. Counsel for the applicant elicited much testi-
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mony concerning the part-time departure of the Gordon 
brothers from William's crew, when the operations in 
the 930 raise were progressing. On direct examination, 
the witness, Kasteler, was asked whether there was any 
discussion with Williams as to "taking" the Gordon broth-
ers out of his crew. Kasteler answered : 
"Their situation was this, as I explained, they 
were going to start the raise, and I assumed that the 
Gordons spoke up and said it would be their inclina-
tion to get that raise on a contract, whether they 
could get a contract to drive that raise "(R. 71). 
There is no evidence as to whether Williams was con-
sulted about this matter or not. Without such evidence any 
inference drawn from the securing of the contract by the 
Gordons would not be legitimate so far as it related to the 
relationship between Williams and the company. A finding 
cannot be predicated upon mere surmise or conjecture. 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
Other important standards, with reference to which the 
status of the applicant may be measured, are stated in the 
case of Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 
172 P. (2d) 136. Briefly the facts in that case were that 
Mr. Molyneaux was injured while he was preparing to 
haul a truck load of coke to the W oolsulate plant, which was 
operated by Parkinson. The Industrial Commission held 
a hearing, in which the evidence showed that Molyneaux 
had made an agreement with Parkinson to haul coke from 
two suppliers in Utah to the W oolsulate Plant and that he 
was to be paid a fixed amount per ton for each load he de-
livered at the plant. The plant's operations required a 
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minimum of 35 tons per week, but Molyneaux was allowed 
to haul all the coke he wanted to, within the capacity of the 
plant to store it. The Industrial Commission decided that 
Molyneaux was an "employee" because of the continuous 
character of the arrangements and the specified minimum 
amount of 35 tons. The Supreme Court reversed the Com-
mission's decision and held that Molyneaux was an inde-
pendent contractor. Among other elements of the contract, 
the Court mentioned that Molyneaux was not required to 
haul for W oolsulate exclusively and that he was free to 
choose the days on which he hauled the coke. The Court held 
that even though this contract was of a continuous character, 
that did not take it out of the category of a "definite job 
or piece of work." 
This holding has particular applicability to the facts of 
our present case. Here, there was more than work of a con-
tinuous nature; this case involved the accomplishment of a 
series of individual projects, all of which were calculated to 
accomplish the larger undertaking of rehabilitating the 
Park City Mine. 
In the course of the opinion of the Parkinson case, the 
court stated: 
"The facts that the company could determine 
the place where the work was to be done and had a 
right to discharge Molyneaux at any time without 
contractual liability are not controlling. Anyone 
employing an independent contractor, such as a 
plumber or a building contractor, has the right to 
determine where he wants the work to be done. It 
is when the employer cannot only determine where 
the work shall be done but how it should be executed 
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that the relationship is that of employer-employee. 
The mere right to discharge without contractual 
liability is not sufficient control to make an employ-
er-employee relationship though it is a factor to be 
considered with all the other pertinent facts and 
circumstances in determining that relationship." 
Assuming a right on the part of either Williams or the 
company to discontinue the contractual relationship, in 
view of the nature of the work being done, i.e., a series of 
specific jobs, the principle above stated may be applied to 
the instant case, and so applied, it supports the conclusion 
that Williams was not an employee but an independent 
contractor. 
Another principle laid down in the Parkinson case 
which provides an additional standard for evaluating the 
status of Williams is that the nature of the skill possessed 
by or the business engaged in by the workman is of vital 
consideration in determining whether the employer has the 
right to control the execution of his work. In our present 
case the record is instinct with recognition of the particular 
knowledge and skill of the applicant with respect to the 
work done in this case. As against this fact, there is evi-
dence that the company had no one at the scene of the opera-
tions with knowledge comparable to that of the applicant. 
In answer to the question whether he was a mining engineer 
or geologist, Kasteler stated : "Well, yes, I might comment on 
that" (R. 64). When asked how much supervision Mr. 
Williams required, Kasteler replied : "None. The best way 
is to leave him alone because he had better knowledge than 
mine" (R. 65) . 
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Finally, in the Parkinson case the court gave recogni-
tion to the fact that whenever the Industrial Commission 
passes on a jurisdictional question, the Supreme Court will 
examine the evidence to see whether it preponderates against 
the conclusions of the Commission. In other words the ex-
istence of ''some" substantial evidence is not enough. The 
court said: 
"As stated by this court in L'uker Sand & Gravel Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, 82 Utah 188, 23 P. 2d 225, 229: 
'Whether or not one engaged in a service for 
another is an employee or an independent contractor, 
within the meaning of the Industrial Commission 
Act, is a jurisdictional question, presenting a situa-
tion which requires this court to determine the status 
from the facts submitted from a preponderance of 
the evidence.' 
It is submitted that a review of the legitimate facts 
contained in the record of this case will show that the In-
dustrial Commission made its conclusion in the face of a 
preponderance of evidence which showed that none of the 
determinative elements of an employer-employee relation-
ship were present. 
There is no substantial evidence upon which an ex-
clusive, reasonable or dominant inference can be based that 
in the performance of the work by Sam Williams, the right 
to control the details of the work shifted from him to Park 
City Consolidated. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
POINT 4. 
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL SHOULD AP-
PLY TO PREVENT SAM E. WILLIAMS FROM 
MAINTAINING A CLAIM FOR BENEFITS 
AGAINST PARK CITY CONSOLIDATED AND 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND. 
All of the necessary elements of estoppel exist in this 
case, to prevent Sam E. Williams from claiming benefits 
under the occupational disease law, against the Park City 
Consolidated Mines Company and the State Insurance Fund, 
for disability chargeable to the period from May 26, 194 7 
to June 13, 1949. In the written contract of May 1947 he 
agreed with Park City Consolidated Mines Company that 
he would do the work as an independent contractor. He 
applied to the State Insurance Fund on Sept. 13, 1947 as · 
an "individual" employer and obtained a compensation 
policy to cover his employees in performing the work at the 
Park City Consolidated property at Park City. The Park 
City Consolidated Mines Company also had a policy in force 
at the same time Williams' policy was in force. 
In signing the May 1947 contract it was the intention 
of both parties to make Williams an independent contractor. 
The intent of the parties is one of the important elements to 
be considered in arriving at a determination of whether the 
relationship of independent contractor or employee exists 
in a given case. Christean vs. Industrial Commission, 113 
Utah 451, 196 Pac. (2nd) 502. 
Mr. Williams continued to so represent his status to 
both the Park City Consolidated and the State Insurance 
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Fund by his reports and his actions during the entire year 
1948 and in the following year until June 13, 1949, as we 
have heretofore pointed out in this brief. He made payroll 
reports and premium payments on the wages of his men 
each month until June 13, 1949 and then he requested the 
State Insurance Fund to cancel the policy (R. 40, 41 and 
83). At no time during the period the policy was in force 
did he suggest to the State Insurance Fund that his status 
as an independent contractor had been changed. To the 
contrary, he inquired at the office of the Fund if he could 
be covered for injuries to himself. He was informed that 
he, as the employer and policy holder, could not be covered 
(R. 40). On January 10, 1949, when he had a serious ac-
cidental injury to his eye in the mine, he did not report it, 
because he understood that injuries to himself were not 
covered and he was not entitled to compensation benefits. 
That itself shows that his intent to be an independent con-
tractor still continued until 1949. 
·.Acting upon Williams' representations during the exist-
ence of his policy, the State Insurance Fund collected prem-
iums from him on the wages of his employees; but no wages 
or income of Williams himself were reported to the Fund. 
So no premium was received by the Fund from either Wil-
liams, under his policy, or from the Park City Consolidated 
Mines Company under their policy, relating to the money 
Williams received from the Company for the period from 
May 26, 194 7 to June 13, 1949. 
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POINT 5. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT 
SAM E. WILLIAMS WAS EXPOSED TO HARM-
FUL QUANTITIES OF SILICON-DIOXIDE 
DUST SIXTY DAYS OR MORE WHILE WORK-
ING FOR PARK CITY CONSOLIDATED MINES 
COMPANY IN 1948 AND 1949. 
An examination of the record reveals the lack of any 
evidence relating to any exposure to silicon-dioxide (silica) 
dust at the Park City Consolidated Mines Company's prop-
erty. It is true that the parties did not object to the medical 
panel's finding that Williams has disabling silicosis and 
tuberculosis (R. 25). Williams worked in the Silver King 
mine from October 5, 1942 to February 1, 1948. He prob-
ably was exposed to silica dust in that mine. 
At the commencement of the hearing (R. 24 and 25), 
the presiding Commissioner said, 
"I assume the parties are willing to stipulate 
that there is nothing material in this matter except 
the sixty-four dollar question as to who is liable, 
whether the Silver King Coalition Mines Company, 
the Continental Casualty Company, the State In-
surance Fund, or the Park City Consolidated Mines 
Company? And that question involves the period of 
employment and the exposure." 
Also during the preliminary part of the hearing (R. 
28), Mr. Williams' attorney, Mr. Hurley, asked, 
"Would the Defendants stipulate that in the 
employment during the period mentioned, while 
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working underground, he was exposed to silicon-
dioxide dust in quantities sufficient to be harmful?" 
Commissioner Wiesley then said, 
"You don't need to stipulate that. He has got 
the disease." 
At no other place in the evidence do we find any refer-
ence to harmful quantities of silicon-dioxide dust at the 
Park City Consolidated at Park City. 
We maintain that it is claimant's burden to prove the 
exposure to silica dust for the necessary sixty day period 
in order to establish a legal basis for holding the last em-
ployer liable under the provisions of Section 42-1a-14 of the 
Occupational Disease Law. The presiding commissioner may 
have misled Mr. Williams' attorney by his expression that 
no proof or stipulation relating to exposure to silica dust, 
was necessary. 
In neither the case of Uta-Carbon Coal Company vs. 
Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 567, 140 Pac. (2nd) 649, 
nor in the case of Kennecott Copper Corp. vs. Industrial 
Commission, 205 Pac. (2nd) 829, did the Utah Supreme 
Court hold that the fact that an employee has silicosis is 
sufficient to relieve him of the necessity of proving exposure 
to some silica dust while he was working for his last em-
ployer. In the case of Pacific Employers Insurance Com-
pany vs. Industrial Commission, 108 Utah 123, 157 Pac. 
(2nd) 800, the non-exposure to silica dust of a watchman 
of mining property was the determining factor which re-
lieved t:Q.e last insurance carrier of any liability in the case. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the award of the Industrial 
Commission against the Park City Consolidated Mines 
Company and The State Insurance Fund, should be an-
nulled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. A. HOWELL, 
GEORGE F. REALL, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
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